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In contemporary international relations India is 
regarded as one of the major powers. India’s emergence 
as a key global actor is based on its international political 
posturing, growing economic strength, dynamic cul-
tural influence and a potent military machine. Gifted by 
these assets India postulates itself as a natural global 
leader. However, India’s power projection is not based 
simply on these inheritances. There is a carefully culti-
vated strategic vision that drives this expansionist pos-
ture. If that is so, how were to identify this vision? What 
are the key components of this strategy? It is argued that 
there is a specific theoretical framework borrowed from a 
two-millennium old indigenous policy framework which 
has stood the test of time, forming the bedrock of contem-
porary Indian international relations. 
Resumo
A Teoria de Rajamandala e as Relações Interna-
cionais da Índia
Nas relações internacionais contemporâneas a 
Índia é vista como uma das maiores potências. A 
ascensão da Índia como um ator-chave no pano-
rama global assenta na sua postura política 
internacional, no seu crescente poder económico, 
numa influência cultural dinâmica e numa 
máquina militar potente. Com base nestes recursos 
o país vê-se a si próprio como um líder natural à 
escala global, existindo uma cuidada e cultivada 
visão estratégica que pauta esta postura expansio-
nista. Sendo este o caso, como se pode identificar 
esta visão? Quais são os componentes-chave desta 
estratégia?
Argumenta-se que existe uma moldura política teó-
rica autóctone e específica que remonta a mais de 
dois mil anos, a qual resistiu ao passar do tempo, 
constituindo a base das relações internacionais con-
temporâneas da Índia.
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Rajamandala Theory and India’s International Relations
In contemporary international relations, India is regarded as one of the major 
powers. India’s emergence as a key global actor is based on its international politi-
cal posturing, growing economic strength, dynamic cultural influence and a potent 
military machine. Gifted by these assets India postulates itself as a natural global 
leader. However, India’s power projection is not based simply on these inherit-
ances. There is a carefully cultivated strategic vision that drives this expansionist 
posture. If that is so, how were to identify this vision? What are the key components 
of this strategy? 
While engaging with the above sets of questions I argue that there is a specific 
theoretical framework that forms the bedrock of contemporary Indian relations. 
Indian external strategy, I wish to argue, borrows from a two-millennium old 
indigenous policy framework that has stood the test of time. The theory in ques-
tion, was developed and examined by several ancient Indian strategic theorists 
(notably Shukra, Manu, and Kamandaka). However, the credit goes to Vishnu 
Gupta or Kautilya (350 BC-275 BC) for perfecting it and providing a coherent 
framework that could be used as a policy by any given sovereign or state seeking to 
gain global supremacy. This idea, the doctrine of the sphere of sovereign influence 
or Rajamandala1 theory introduced in Kautilya’s most celebrated work the Artha-
shastra is the most fundamental in terms of providing a viable strategic imperative 
to the state’s external power projection. 
This essay is built around four interconnected themes. First, it introduces Rajaman-
dala theory. Second, it examines the explanation of international relations within the 
ambits of this theory. Third, it brings into discussion the dimension of expansion-
ism and how India has positioned itself in recent years in the global arena. Fourth 
and last, it postulates the tensions in current Indian strategic thinking and the 
broader ramifications Rajamandala theory. In sum, this essay is a critical reflection 
on the theoretical and policy linkages between Kautilya’s Rajamandala theory and 
the nature of contemporary Indian international relations. 
Rajamandala Theory
While the Rajamandala theory is generally attributed Kautilya he was one of several 
thinkers who engaged with this idea in ancient India and perfected it as an integral 
instrument of statecraft. The Arthashastra (the treatise/discourse on means to order) 
one of the earliest examples in the world of a manual devoted to the strategy of 
power was a collective effort by several thinkers over a length of time, perhaps 
stretching over centuries (Roy, 2013: 75). 
1 This premise is also popularly known as Mandala theory. However, I would use the term Raja-
mandala throughout this essay, owing to the rather expansive definition that Rajamandala pro-
vides over the somewhat constricting dimension of Mandala. 
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Kautilya’s interpretation of the nature and character of international society has 
remained timeless. The Arthashastra was written in times when the subcontinent 
was divided into a number of small and mutually hostile states. Therefore, it was 
necessary for a king to not only protect his state but also deal with hostile kings and 
expand his territory (Gupta, 2014).
There are several aspects to Kautilya’s magnum opus the Arthashastra. The purpose 
of this study is to examine the strategy of inter-state relations. While so doing, it 
debates Rajamandala theory or Mandala theory that is often regarded Kautilya’s core 
thesis dealing with the state-centred strategic vision. While staying true to this theory 
this essay asks if one could draw parallels between contemporary Indian strategic 
thinking and the core directions enumerated by Kautilya in his Rajamandala theory.
While commonly understood as a foreign policy outline, in its true manifestation 
Rajamandala theory is an expression of a state’s “internal” and “external” sovereignty. 
It postulates that a state’s sovereignty is in fact two dimensional. While the primary 
expression of that sovereignty is almost always easily identifiable (i.e. the sovereignty 
of the state over its natural political frontiers and the subjects living within it), the 
external dimension of this sovereignty is much more difficult to pin down. 
Thus it receives its true meaning through a given state’s ability to establish its cre-
dence outside its legally recognised boundaries. Therefore, according to the Rajaman-
dala theory, a state can only be truly sovereign state when it “can exercise its internal 
authority unobstructed by, and independently of other states” (Sarkar, 1919: 400). It 
is this power in relation to other state that is paramount in understanding the full 
remits of Rajamandala theory and consequently the strategic depth of a state. 
In Kautilya’s conception, every sovereign state, polity or ruler is surrounded by 
many similar sovereign entities. In this galaxy of states there would always be one 
sovereign who would be a natural adversary to this king or ruler. He further 
reminds his audience that of this galaxy of states there would be vassals, allies, 
neutral and hostile sovereigns. However, the sovereign must pay the utmost 
emphasis to the natural enemy or state and do his utmost to defeat it.
Besides there are two inter-related facets to Kautilya’s Arthashastra. While its core 
advice to the sovereign was the preservation of the state, it also expected the ruler 
to engage in expansionism that involved conquest of new territories under the con-
trol of other rulers or sovereigns. It was, in essence, a theory of world conquest. 
Kautilya was “an expansionist who provided a discourse on strategic culture to the 
sovereign that not only seeks the preservation of the state but also amply pushes 
forward a framework that seeks to conquer territories of others” (Karad, 2015: 324). 
For the sovereign, “Rajamandala theory is the plan, the blueprint of the expedition 
with the intention of world conquest” (Karad, 2015: 327). In Abul Fazl’s interpreta-
tion of Kautilya’s Rajamandala “the sovereign whose territory adjoined to his, 
although he might be friendly in appearance, yet ought not to be trusted; he was 
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always be prepared to oppose any sudden attack from that quarter. A king who 
attempted to give trouble to another king without reasonable cause was an artificial 
enemy of that king” (Alami, 1993: 495).
The World According to Rajamandala 
Arguably, Rajamandala theory “is at the core of Kautilya’s conceptualisation of state 
affairs, which is the theory of omnipotence” (Karad, 2015: 322). It is based on the 
geopolitical and geostrategic assumption that “your neighbour is your natural 
enemy and the neighbour’s neighbour is your friend”. This was the basic thought 
behind Kautilya’s Rajamandala theory. In view of many critics, “it is ‘[t]he Kautilyan 
concept of power (mandala), centring around the would-be conqueror (vijigishu) 
who uses six fold policy (sadgunya) to assume the position of a universal ruler 
(chakravartin) which is of supreme importance if one were to make sense of the 
Mandala theory” (Sarkar, 1919; Gautam, 2013: 21). 
If one were to give it a visual representation, Kautilya’s theory of the international 
system, from the perspective of a sovereign it could be represented by a series of 
concentric circles. In this conception, if the sovereign resides at the centre of this 
circle, hostile states are those that border the ruler’s state, forming a circle around 
it. In turn, states that surround this set of hostile states form another circle around 
the circle of hostile states. This second circle of states can be considered the natural 
allies of the ruler’s state against the hostile states that lie between them. Conse-
quently, the sovereign wishing power and domination always try to put his state at 
the centre (nabhi) of the Circle and simultaneously make the friendly powers the 
spokes of the wheel (nemi).
Picture 1 – Visual Representation of Inter-state Relations according to  
Rajamandala Theory 
Source: Singh (2011: 11)
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Therefore, according to the above framework, “the king who is situated anywhere 
immediately on the circumference of the conqueror's territory is termed the enemy. 
The king who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the con-
queror only by the enemy, is termed the friend (of the conqueror)” (The Arthasastra, 
1992).
Speaking of enemies, and allies, Kautilya is well known for outlining and applying 
the ‘Rajamandala Theory of Foreign Policy’. The basic argument in his theory is that 
any neighbouring state should be considered as a potential enemy, and dealt with 
cautiously. This is because, Kautilya argues, all states act in their own self-interest, 
be it through waging war or negotiating peace. According to the Mandala theory, 
regional states are grouped in a circle and are numbered. Kautilya suggests that any 
states located on the other side of an enemy state can be considered an ally. 
The most obvious reason for this categorization seems to be the concept of ‘sand-
wiching the enemy’. In more contemporary terms Kautilya’s Rajamandala Theory 
can best be described by the principle stating the enemy of my enemy is my friend 
(Boesche, 2002).
Kautilya observed that every state is surrounded by many states, and there cannot 
be friendly states all around. In other words, the external frontiers of a given state 
can be divided into friendly and enemy territories. However, the important ques-
tion that arises in this context is how does one recognize/label the tag of hostile 
enemy or genuine friendly frontier or territory. Kautilya’s identity marker in this 
context was deceptively simply. In the Arthashastra, he proposed, that a sovereign’s 
enemy’s enemy could be accorded the status of a friend. And an enemy’s friend 
should be treated as an enemy.
One of the key aspects of the Rajamandala theory with regard to the conduct of busi-
ness with the enemy state has to do with the continuance of a hostile offensive 
defence position. Having identified the enemy (state) Kautilya suggested, the sover-
eign should conduct his/her hostility as an open undertaking. Since Kautilya’s theo-
risation of inter-state external relations explains, “how the political world works 
actually, than that it ought to be” (Karad, 2015: 322), it has a strong resonance in the 
strategic vision of New Delhi. As one observer put it, “since its independence, India’s 
international behaviour has unfolded in line with this theoretical logic. For starters, 
India has failed to set up good relations with neighbouring countries in the region. 
It has long been engaged in a rivalry with Pakistan, and it is also far from friendly 
with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Antagonism with its neighbouring countries 
remains a main element of India’s foreign policy” (Xinmin, 2014: 147).
While this may be true, one could also testify to the fact that bar its archrival 
Pakistan, from time to time, India has tried to build bridges with its other imme- 
diate neighbours. How was then one to explain New Delhi’s overtures in the con-
text of good neighbourly borderland policy? Again, while somewhat friendly, this 
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relationship has always been a tense affair. New Delhi simply has not succeeded in 
ridding the relationships of mutual distrust, tension, unilateral interference, occa-
sional hostility, and thawing of bonhomie. 
These far from friendly relations can be explained within Kautilya’s conception of 
the Rajamandala. For, “the idea of the Rajamandala holds that relations between two 
contingent states will generally be tense, a fact that was definitely true of many 
regions, such as Europe, until fairly recently (this does not preclude the possibility 
of a neighbour being friendly or a vassal). This idea may explain the perception 
among India’s smaller South Asian neighbours that India is an overbearing and 
dominating neighbour” (Pillalamarri, 2015: 17).
On his swearing in ceremony the 14th Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narendra 
Modi, invited all the heads of states of South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) to his swearing-in ceremony. Nothing wrong with that ges-
ture. But examined within the above theory one could interpret it as an emperor’s 
coronation invitation where the vassals were made obliged to come and pay their 
allegiance and respect. That all was not well with this bonhomie was soon appar-
ent. Within months after this gathering, New Delhi’s relationship with some of 
these very states metamorphosed into open criticism and hostility. Note, for 
instance, the landlocked republic of Nepal’s recent plight. New Delhi brought the 
country’s economy and life to a standstill for over four months (November 
2015-February 2016) by orchestrating an internal dissent amongst a section of the 
country’s populace. This led to the citizenry of some of those states openly con-
demning India as a big power bully.
In view of one critic, “India has always been on a high-alert and kept a very defen-
sive attitude against interactive ties between any non-regional countries, especially 
big powers, and other countries in the subcontinent” (Xinmin, 2014: 159). This has 
been evidenced in case of Chinese economic and military incursions in Sri Lanka in 
the past. In recent years it has also been very critical of China-Pakistan economic 
corridor that connects northwest China with Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast. In view 
of some observers, this “strategic partnership between Pakistan and China has 
upset India and consequently it has openly voiced its opposition to the project” 
(Bhutta, 2015: 3). According to one Chinese scholar, such moves “may not be a 
purely historical coincidence. The strong magic power of India’s Mandala geo-stra-
tegic thought and its strategic intention of seeking regional hegemony in South 
Asia are quite apparent” (Xinmin, 2014: 159).
If that were so, one could also identify New Delhi’s representation of the immediate 
neighbour as ari or enemy and the one beyond the territory of the immediate neigh-
bour as mitra or friend. Within the workings of this schema Afghanistan bordering 
Pakistan has been a traditional ally of New Delhi. So is India’s relationship with 
Mongolia that sits just outside ari imagery (i.e. the immediate neighbour China). To 
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some observers, through its strategic partnership with Mongolia, “India is signal-
ling something vital to the Chinese that the country can reach out to its backyard 
for apparent strategic considerations” (Chaturvedi, 2015: 2).
In recent years, we have witnessed New Delhi cultivating mitras (friends) as a bul-
wark against the aris (enemies). What New Delhi has been engaged with and is fast 
unveiling is the introduction and consolidation of several strategic corridors that 
allows it to counter its ies (immediate enemy). A case in point is the opening up of 
a strategic corridor with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
India and the United Arab Emirates have started a new strategic partnership after 
a landmark visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Abu Dhabi in August, 2015, 
which includes unprecedented cooperation on counter terrorism, especially signifi-
cant given that the UAE has traditionally been a close ally of Pakistan (NDTV, 
2016).
Similarly, in 2015 India and Vietnam signed a joint vision statement for five years, 
which while it aims at “enhancing their bilateral defence cooperation” (The Times 
of India, 2015) is in reality a defence pact whole primary objective is to undermine 
China’s hegemony in the South China Sea.
Power Consolidation-Expansion
According to the Rajamandala theory, the sovereign who has established his leader-
ship or the state that finds itself firmly at the centre of a constellation of states occu-
pies the site towards which other sovereigns or states gravitate. Put simply, “the 
theory of a circle of states entails that every ruler within an international system 
will find his (or her) state at the centre of its own circle of states. This ruler is 
described as a vijigishu, or would-be conqueror, whose power ought to gradually 
radiate into ever more distant circles” (Pillalamarri, 2015: 17). But what should the 
sovereign do to maintain that centrality? 
One of the attendant features of Rajamandala as a strategic doctrine is to push an 
expansionist agenda for the sovereign. In its crudest form this expansionism may 
signify physical expansion through conquest of new territories, subjugation of 
nations and people outside the state’s borders. For The Arthashastra “preaches the 
ideal of conquest meaning the ruler or the sovereign should be desirous of digvijaya 
(the conquest of all known territories on its borders)” (Roy, 2013: 77). In this frame-
work vijigishu/vijigeesoo (ideal ruler or sovereign) should be an aspirant to conquer 
and conquest. 
The expansionist ideal, of course, is not a given. Kautilya makes it very explicit 
under what circumstance a state or a sovereign can embark on that path. First if a 
state is a in a state of downward slide, if its sovereignty is under threat, it is a in a 
state of decline and there are serious questions surrounding its future stability, the 
ruler or the sovereign should make every effort at defending its sovereignty by 
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making alliances, solving internal problems and so on. On the other hand, if the 
state is set on a course of steady economic growth, with a contended citizenry, and 
no serious threat to its frontiers and most crucial of it is being led by an able and 
visionary leadership then it is in a natural position to embark on a path of conquest 
of the neighbouring states (Kautilya, 1992; Boesche, 2003: 4).
The raison d’etre of an effective sovereign or a sovereign state is to establish himself/
itself as the nabhi (or centre of gravity) of a system – in this case the international 
system (The Arthashastra, 1992). Or, as one of the earliest modern scholars put it, the 
sovereign “should become the lord of a mandala. It is part of his (the sovereign’s) 
duty to try to have a full sphere around him just as the moon is encircled by a com-
plete orb” (Sarkar, 1919: 402). 
Yet, interestingly, the conquest or expansionist objective encompassed a hard power 
expansionism referring to territorial gains by the sovereign or vijigishu desirous or 
aspirant to world conquest. The theory provided a framework for the sovereign to 
go beyond the mere conquest of physical territories and become a true world con-
queror (i.e. chakravartin through soft power projection). Kautilya did not see this 
conquest as something unjust. A sovereign who carried out his duties, ruled accord-
ing to law, meted out only just punishment, applied the law equally to his son and 
his enemy, and protected his subjects not only went to heaven but had conquered 
the earth up to its four ends.
In Kautilya’s conception there can be three distinct sets of expansion by a given 
sovereign. They are dharmavijaya (conquest for the sake of glory); lobhavijaya (over-
throw of the adversary for economic gains); and asuravijaya (the base expansion 
which results in annihilating your enemy and appropriating their women). The 
ideal expansion or conquest, according to Kautilya, is for the sake of glory (dharma-
vijaya). For the sovereign who wishes to remain the centre gravity can only remain 
so through dharmavijaya.
So, how does contemporary India feature in this system?
First, India has never been an expansionist state. While the physical or territo- 
rial expansionism has never been an avowed state policy, one cannot say the 
same so far as New Delhi’s perpetual attempts at seeking to expand its area of 
influence.
In this context, one could argue that there has always been a clearly defined pattern 
to India’s ideologically driven expansionism in the post-independence period. 
Faced by two aggressive superpowers (United States and Soviet Union) who were 
engaged in a relentless campaign to ever widen their sphere of influence during the 
Cold War years, India chose the safer alternative of reaching out to the hesitant and 
unsure group of nations through its policy of nonalignment. While a global ideal, 
shared by many non-western post-colonial states, India nonetheless was the natu-
ral leader in this forum. Through the nonalignment movement better known 
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through its acronym NAM, New Delhi forever sought to consolidate its position as 
the primus inter pares. 
In recent years, New Delhi would appear to claim a global leadership role not only 
in hard power context but in soft power posturing as well. Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi’s suggestion that India is a natural global leader in the areas of 
economy, environment and manpower are cases in point (Time, 2015). With that 
aim in mind New Delhi has focused on establishing a secure network of friends and 
allies in far afield. The India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) that pledged African 
nations US$ 600 million seeks to establish a specific strategic depth in Africa. 
India’s emphasis on ‘blue economy’ that brings Africa and India through the com-
mon sea frontier of the Indian Ocean is likely to score that soft power expansionist 
dividend. Also symbolic in this equation is mission statement of IAFS through its 
lion representation logo – which while gives an equal share to Africa nonetheless 
makes no secret of India’s strategic ambitions “proud, courageous, bold and on the 
prowl, ready to take on the future and seize every opportunity” (The Business 
Standard, 2015).
This vision of soft power expansionism is further consolidated by a carefully culti-
vated diplomacy that has sought to translate specific Indian cultural practices (such 
as Yoga) into universal global values. India’s soft power and expansionist ambition 
go hand-in-hand. And, it is no longer a secret. In the words of India’s top diplomat, 
External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, the “UN’s decision to commemorate the 
International Day of Yoga underlines the appreciation for India and its growing soft 
power” (NDTV, 2015).2
Advantage Alliance
In view of some critics, Kautilya’s Matsya Nyaya “entails struggle for power as the 
sine qua non of the ‘internal’ as well as the ‘external sovereignty in the international 
arena” (Upadhyaya, 2009: 73). While Kautilya is clear about the nature of interna-
tional system, in the Arthashastra he nonetheless suggest the sovereign to make 
peace with ari (or enemy) in order to secure the required time to enhance one’s own 
power or establish a balance of power. While useful measures, they should, how-
ever, be temporary. These strategies should be abandoned as and when the sover-
eign is confident of his power and that of the state he rules. This striving towards 
enhancing one’s power deficiency is solely aimed at consolidating the sovereign’s 
strength in comparison to the enemy. 
2 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the idea in his address to the UN General 
Assembly in September 2014. This proposal was co-sponsored by 177 countries, out of 193 
member states. This move created a new record for the highest number of co-sponsoring 
nations for a General Assembly Resolution.
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In his seminal essay on Indian strategic culture, military historian and theorist 
George Tanham suggested, “India’s self-conception, its geography, and military 
strength are of supreme importance in shaping the strategic culture” (Tanham, 
1992: 129). Some quarter-of-a-century on while all of those parameters still deter-
mine India’s strategic depth, a new rubric (i.e. economy) has come into play. Apart 
from being a great military power India has also clocked in an impressive economic 
growth rate in recent years (surpassing its arch-rival China in 2015). This develop-
ment provides critical impetus to the shaping of New Delhi’s own imagination of 
itself in the global stage and subsequently its strategic behaviour. 
Way back in 1992 Tanham suggested that “some Indians would like India to be a 
great power, as opposed to a voice in the world” (Tanham, 1992: 129). Finally, nearly 
a quarter-of-a-century since, India appears to be steadying itself on that path of 
seeking a great power identity pursuing a 
bigger and stronger economic, cultural and soft power variety. In his recent visit to 
the United Kingdom, the Indian Prime Minister addressed a congregation of some 
60 thousand non-resident Indians in the Wembley Sports Arena, London. In that 
speech he demanded that the world treat India as an equal (“we don't want favours 
from the world, we want equal stature” – Dowerah, 2015), sums up the direction in 
India’s strategic depth. Following on that he repeated the theme during the course 
of Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN) meeting in Kuala Lumpur. 
During his speech Modi proclaimed “we know that our time has come” (India 
Today, 2015). While this was in reference to the emerging role of Asia in interna-
tional scene, the attempt was to put India at the heart of that Asian Century. 
While this may be a legitimate aspiration, here one cannot help avoid asking the 
question: how far is India capable in terms of leading that Asian Century? Or can it 
be a dominant player in the scheme of things if there is ever an Asian Century? 
Let me engage with these two interrelated questions head on. There are two key 
components to New Delhi’s aspirations with regard to be at the forefront of this 
strategic vision. They are guided, in equal measures, by soft power strategy as well 
as the realpolitik considerations suggested along the lines of Kautilya.
In Kautilya’s conception the sovereign ought to develop the ambit of his sover-
eignty by augmenting and exploiting its resources and power base. How is New 
Delhi exploiting its resources and its powerbase? 
Thanks to its traditional rivalry/enmity with China and a majority of South East 
Asian states discomfort with the rising Chinese muscle in the region, New Delhi 
has a natural advantage. By using my ‘enemy’s enemy as my ally’ New Delhi 
has pushed forward a new strategic vision in the South East Asian region. It has 
cultivated Myanmar and Vietnam as strategic partners, reiterated its stand as 
the defender of half-a-dozen regional powers claims over the South China Sea 
islands. Most important of all there are now talks of New Delhi and Washington 
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joint patrols in South China Sea (Miglani, 2016). These developments have given 
an unprecedented strategic depth to New Delhi’s big power ambitions in the 
region. 
While economic growth and material progress would appear to be a natural 
yearning for a state, the sovereign can use the idea of progress as part of consolida-
tion of power and external outreach or non-territorial conquest. While India-Africa 
forum (discussed earlier) could be argued to aim at countering China in the exter-
nal third and fourth ambit of the concentric circle in the Rajamandala diagram the 
initiatives in cultural diplomacy could be argued as strategies aimed at encasing 
India’s interest in the outermost circles.
Similarly, Kautilya required his sovereign to be both pragmatic and prudence. Such 
an outlook and policy posture allowed him maximum flexibility in his foreign 
affairs and helped towards extending the remits of the state’s sovereignty. Having 
ignored its sizeable diaspora community in the past, New Delhi has begun to 
embrace them in order to extend and boost its sphere of influence externally. In 
recent years, the advantage to its strategic posturing is aided by the presence of a 
significant Indian diaspora in countries like Singapore and Malaysia and its cul-
tural influence in archipelagic Indonesia and mainland states of Cambodia and 
Laos. These physical and cultural ties have steered India’s strategic ambitions into 
safer waters. 
Yet as Yitzhak Klein put it, a nation’s strategic culture “can be assessed, compared 
and analysed by means of a paradigm that represents them as a hierarchy of con-
cepts on several levels: political, strategic, and operational” (Klein, 1991: 3). A coun-
try’s security culture is often formed by the strategic preferences of the entire soci-
ety and political elites on some policies and actions that are different from other 
countries (Duffield, 1999). “We witness that Indians may or may not be secular, 
may or may not want a Hindu nation, but they all unanimously want to get ahead, 
they want the country to progress and in peace – without lynching or riots” 
(Chaudhry, 2015). It is in this context that India’s knowledge economy would 
appear to have a great potential to fulfil New Delhi’s global ambitions. 
The Restraints
“The measure of a country’s strategic depth is examined not only by the impor-
tance it carries at the international level but also how it conducts itself internally. 
Strategically a country is only taken seriously at the international context if it is 
found to be equally robust in terms of addressing the issues and challenges inter-
nally. A continental sized country; India’s external standing is undermined by the 
problems it faces internally. India’s strategic ambition to be considered as a great 
power is thwarted by the dissent and conflict at home. India’s most pressing strate-
gic security concern is its own internal disunity” (Tanham, 2002: 24).
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In spite of the great external success story, since the late 1980s the country has been 
fraying on the edges. There have been several full-blown separatist movements 
along its borders. “For the last one decade-and-half it is caught up in an internal 
insurgency in the form of Maoist uprising across the eastern, central and southern 
regions of the country” (Misra, 2002: 76). If in the external ambits contemporary 
Indian strategic culture is governed by the Mandala theory (as we discussed earlier), 
one could find its reflection in the internal arena as well. This is being pursued very 
vigorously in recent years. As a variation of that theory “the sovereign’s enemy’s 
friend is an enemy has been used very liberally to quash separatism and secession-
ism especially in the context of insurgency in the Punjab, Kashmir, the greater 
North-Eastern region” (Misra, 2001: 51).
A great power ambition requires great power responsibility. Does India have the 
required strength and wherewithal to address the internal challenges? Kautilya, in 
his formulation, cautioned against the use of continuous force against internal dis-
sent. While the Indian state has been primarily hegemonic in its treatment of the 
dissenters, one could nonetheless identify a policy shift in the earlier full-blown 
military engagement against the internal adversaries. While it has not completely 
abandoned the military option the new preferred method seems to be rapproche-
ment. Note, for instance, the ruling nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) deci-
sion to engage ex-separatists in the troubled province of Jammu and Kashmir in the 
provincial electoral politics. 
While there has been a groundswell support for New Delhi that India be made a 
member of the United Nations Security Council by some of the important players 
in international relations such as the United States and United Kingdom at the 
same time they have voiced their concern about India’s internal record. The issue of 
minority security, tolerance and ability to address dissent has featured time and 
again in Indian leadership’s interaction with the heavyweights in the international 
arena (Dreher, 2015).
This would suggest, no matter how hard New Delhi positions itself in the interna-
tional arena and how persistently the country presents itself as a strategic partner 
in ridding the world of global threats – from climate change to terrorism – it is 
going to land itself in the back if it does not address some of the pressing issues 
affecting the internal order and consequently its international image. 
Even if India manages to sort out the internal problems there are other hurdles that 
it needs to address if it were to extend its remits of influence externally. While the 
Rajamandala theory is helpful a consistent and continuous treatment of the immedi-
ate neighbour as the natural and permanent ari (enemy) does not necessarily provide 
strategic depth to the country in the long run. India’s current predisposition towards 
initiating a strategic dialogue with the international world seem to be wholly and 
squarely dominated by its monochromatic vision of its arch enemy (i.e. Pakistan). 
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Whatever India does or seeks to achieve at the international level seem to be guided 
by its reflection on Pakistan. The constant discussion on combating terrorism at the 
international level has its roots in India’s inability to counter Pakistani designs 
in Indian territory. A country’s strategic vision can only be termed dynamic if it 
succeeds in freeing itself from the shackles of such historic obsession. This would 
mean New Delhi rejig some of its policy planning in relation to Islamabad.
Pragmatic Ambiguities 
While Kautilya weighs heavily in contemporary Indian strategic doctrine there are 
several oddities in New Delhi’s power posturing. These ideas or worldviews do 
not necessarily gel well with the realist framework of international relations that 
Kautilya proposed and India seems to have embraced.
If one were to concentrate on those aspects that have contributed most to the shap-
ing of Indian strategic thinking it is the civilizational inheritance, which would 
seem to dominate this discourse. In view of one critic, “strategic culture is made 
up of a country’s worldview, judgment of subject-object relations and model of 
behaviours based on that country’s geography, history and economic and political 
development” (Xinmin, 2014: 151). For more than any other component it is com-
posite identity that has had a massive bearing on that thinking and continues to do 
so. India has always been a multi-religious state and various regimes for over mil-
lennia have tried to put their imprint on the country’s strategic vision through the 
leadership’s own specific outlook: hence, the continuation of a specific policy pos-
ture through the ages.
If history has contributed to the shaping of Indian strategic culture again it is this 
inheritance which underwrites India’s resolve to provide a well-articulated vision. 
As one contemporary critic put it, “one striking feature of Indian discourse on 
peace and conflict has been its eclectic weltanschaung, which traditionally allows a 
fusion of divergent and often contrary view points” (Upadhyaya, 2009: 72).
New Delhi, ever since India’s independence, has perpetually claimed it to be a 
nation that operates at the international scene by a code of conduct enshrined in the 
principles of ahimsa (non-violence), panchasheel (peaceful cooperation) and most 
importantly non-alignment. These defining principles in Indian strategic culture 
are not some mere afterthoughts but carefully constructed paradigms that have 
their origin in specific religious ethics and a product of its historical inheritance.
Turning to ahimsa we find it is not a theory that was invented by New Delhi by 
focussing astutely on contemporary international relations but was plucked up 
from its history. This is a principle that has been practiced by millions of Hindus, 
Buddhists and Jains from time immemorial. Thus while embracing non-violence as 
a policy principle New Delhi has simply borrowed an old concept and used it for 
the betterment of its strategic interests in contemporary international relations. 
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In India, it is believed that the spirituality and mysticism of the Hindu religion 
can bestow moral and logical legality upon India’s international status (Xinmin, 
2014: 153).
One could posit something similar on the principle of panchasheel – the idea of a 
peaceful coexistence with your neighbours. This ideal, popularised by India’s first 
Prime Minister Nehru has its basis in the principles followed by one of India’s fore-
most emperors whose reign predated Alexander the Great’s invasion of India. 
Asoka is unique in ancient Indian strategic culture in the sense that his was a truly 
international empire. While he extended the physical frontiers of his state, as part 
of military expansionism, he was equally successful in enforcing the vision of good 
life in territories far beyond his. 
Asoka’s empire, which extended from modern day Myanmar in the East to Afghani-
stan in the West, was notable for maintaining friendly good relations with its neigh-
bours. His empire was not only non-violent but equally non-interventionist. This 
principle of respect towards your neighbours in contemporary Indian diplomacy is 
a direct borrowing from Asokan emphasis on recognition and respect towards one’s 
sovereign peers or neighbours. How did contemporary India combine the ideas of 
Kautilya and Asoka who sat in two extremes of their ideological positions?
According to one observer: 
“For much of the modern era, independent India’s thinking on politics and 
international relations were derived not from the Arthashastra or similar 
works, but from the non-alignment and pacifism of Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Mahatma Gandhi, who were perhaps loosely inspired by the example of 
Asoka, grandson of Kautilya’s king. Asoka abjured realpolitik and attempted 
to run his empire on the principles of morality and peace (the Mauryan 
Empire fell apart quickly after Asoka’s death) (Pillalamari, 2015: 19).
Apart from these acknowledged borrowing there have been several other discreet 
intervention by religion in shaping India’s contemporary strategic thought. The 
most glaring yet not talked about aspect of this is the role of Islam or Muslim popu-
lation towards New Delhi’s policy postures. A citizenry with a Hindu majority, 
India nonetheless, cultivated a very vibrant and productive relationship with scores 
of Muslim states in Middle East for nearly half-a-century (from 1947-2002).
Its heavy energy dependence on the Middle Eastern oil and gas resources necessi-
tated New Delhi to cultivate a friendly relation with the states in the region. It could 
win major concessions in its dependence by playing its role in hosting the second-
major Muslim population in the world. This chunk of its citizenry (belonging to the 
Islamic faith), in other words, were show-cased whenever it went on a ‘charm 
offensive’ vis a vis Islamic nations in the Middle East. Interestingly, this reference 
to Islam in general and its Muslim population in particular, has been as much a 
blessing as a restraint in terms of achieving strategic objectives. 
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Its proximity to the Muslim nations in the Middle East implied, New Delhi follows 
the former’s foreign policy objectives or risk ostracism and loss of concessionary oil 
and gas largesse. Therefore, to placate its own Muslim lobby and to be a good reli-
able partner to its Middle Eastern counterparts, New Delhi did not have diplomatic 
relations with for almost half-a-century. Its strategic autonomy, in other words, was 
hamstrung by the religious components of the society and the external environ-
ment. Yet, that has not guaranteed a long-term strategic depth to New Delhi in the 
region. A case in point is Iran’s return from international isolation. 
When Teheran was under a Western economic blockade New Delhi actively pur-
sued several high-profile trade initiatives (notably iron-for-oil agreement). India 
was severely criticised for doing business with a pariah regime at the time and New 
Delhi felt it could weather that wrath by winning over Tehran by entering into an 
all-weather partnership programme. Iran’s return from international isolation in 
early 2016, however, saw Tehran unilaterally cancelling many of the earlier deals 
with New Delhi (the accusation here was India took unfair advantage when Iran 
was on its knees). To add insult to injury, in the very first week of its emergence 
from the blockade Iran entered into several high-profile arms, economic and trade 
agreements with China while completely ignoring India. 
The principle of non-alignment to which New Delhi was wedded firmly is yet 
another point in the discussion surrounding the religious ethos and the country’s 
external strategic policy postures. By remaining true to the principles of non-align-
ment, India gained massive economic and moral dividend in a Cold War domi-
nated international relations. However, it was precisely because of its reliance on 
this specific principle with its roots in Hindu belief in neutrality that undermined 
the country from evolving into a more powerful nation. 
Yet, in view of one critic, “the modern Indian concept of non-alignment itself may 
be a reflection of Kautilya’s advice for a nation to only follow its self-interest and 
not get locked into permanent enmity or friendship with any other nation” (Pilla-
lamari, 2015: 19). When confronted by hard realities and challenges at an interna-
tional arena, India has dug deep into its moral reserve of its great pacifist leaders. 
This trait is evident, more than ever, in the “strategic speak” of the current govern-
ment. India’s current Prime Minister never fails to use the stock phrases like Asoka, 
Akbar, Buddha and Gandhi when trying to place India in the broader international 
context or to chart the course of its strategic initiative. 
Conclusion
Kautiulya’s Arthashastra did not deal with “a particular state in a historical time, 
but with the state as a concept” (Rangarajan, 1992: 542). Therefore the theoretical 
framework offered by Kautilya not only has a timeless appeal, but it is also primar-
ily secular in its orientation. It is these twin aspects, which have allowed the Indian 
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state to appropriate parts of this treatise in its foreign policy undertakings and con-
sequently the overall strategic vision. Recognising the contribution of The Artha-
shastra in general, and Rajamandala theory in particular, Shiv Shankar Menon, the 4th 
National Security Advisor of India (2010-2014) acknowledged, that this treatise “is 
a serious manual on statecraft, on how to run a state, informed by a higher purpose, 
clear and precise in its prescriptions, the result of practical experience of running a 
sate. It is not just a normative text but a realist description of the art of running a 
state” (Menon, 2012: 13).
Kautilya’s depiction of the external world, from the viewpoint of a sovereign, as an 
anarchical world marked by internecine struggle for power, it is a state of affairs 
where various polities push their national interests, and it is a world where entities 
enter into diplomatic alliances either to avoid aggression or gain strategic advan-
tage in a hostile situation are the constants that have remained timeless. 
Guided by these realities New Delhi has remained close to Kautilya’s prescription 
of statecraft. “While at one level it pursues the ambition of chakravartin (world con-
quest) through soft power export it has also been realistic by staying true to Kau-
tilya’s prescriptions on seeking peace with other sovereign entities as the true 
foundation of lasting internal security and stability” (Upadhyaya, 2009: 73). 
Prior to the rise of Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Indian strategic 
thinking, was primarily ad hoc in nature. As George T. Tanham argued in his 2002 
essay, in the past, Indians “did not address the problems seriously until a real crisis 
arises” (Tanham, 2002: 82). Interestingly, “after the end of the Cold War, India has 
begun to apply more of the Arthashastra’s maxims as it has grown in confidence and 
ability and realized the necessity of pursuing its own interests, regardless of their 
normative component” (Pillalamarri, 2015: 19). Under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Modi there has been a rethinking on future Indian strategic culture. Con-
fident, externally oriented, self-assured in the changed circumstances the signature 
of this strategy seems to be both militarily robust and expansionist in the soft power 
context.
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